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OF SECTION 241(f) OF THE IMMIGRATION
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[I]n the never, never land of the Immigration and Nationality
Act . . plain words do not always mean what they say.t
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The number of illegal aliens in the United States is esti-
mated to be between 800,000 and 1,000,000, and the vast ma-
jority of these are natives of the Republic of Mexico.' During
fiscal 1972, 505,949 illegal aliens were located or apprehended
by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service
(Service) .2 Although the vast majority of the illegal entrant aliens
apprehended have been here but a short period of time, over ten
percent have been in this country for periods exceeding six months.3
Frequently, aliens apprehended after having been here for rela-
tively long periods of time have established familial ties with a
United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence. In addition, an alien who has lived in the United
States for some time will probably have employment which is
more satisfactory and lucrative than that obtainable in his native
land.4
t Yuen Sang Low v. Attorney General, 479 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973).
* Senior Trial Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San
Diego, California. B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., Northwestern Univer-
sity; LL.M., Northwestern University. Member, California, Illinois, and United
States Supreme Court Bars.
** J.D. Candidate, California Western School of Law.
1. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL STUDY GROUP ON ILLEGAL IMMI-
GRANTS FROM MEXICO, A PROGRAM FOR EFFECTIVE AND HUMANE ACTION ON IL-
LEGAL MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS 6 (1973).
2. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1972 ANNUAL REPORT OF IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 ANNUAL REPORT].
Of all the deportable aliens located, 85% were Mexican citizens and 79% had
illegally entered this country at places other than designated ports of entry.
3. The Service estimates that in fiscal 1972, 48% of the aliens were appre-
hended within 72 hours after their arrival, 21% within four to 30 days after
arrival and 19% within one to six months after arrival. Id.
4. See United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973), appeal
docketed.
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An alien apprehended after entering this country, even
though here illegally, is entitled to many basic rights,5 including
the right to a deportation hearing before he can be expelled.
However, only a small percentage of those entitled to such hear-
ings demand them. This is exemplified by fiscal 1972 statistics
which reveal that of the one-half million aliens apprehended only
16,266 were actually deported.6 The Immigration and National-
ity Act (Act) provides that an alien may be granted a voluntary
departure in lieu of being deported. 7  The alien with familial
ties could accept a voluntary departure, return to his native land,
and apply for admission into the United States under the sections
of the Act granting preferential treatment in re-entering.8 The
alien who is not a native of the Western Hemisphere may also
attempt to remain in this country and seek adjustment of status
from that of an unlawful entrant to that of an alien lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence. 9
5. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (Fifth
and Sixth Amendments); The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher),
189 U.S. 86 (1903) (Fifth Amendment); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33 (1950) (procedures required by Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324,
§§ 5, 11, 60 Stat. 239, 244 (1946), as amended 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 3105 (1970)).
See also United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971), which reversed
an illegal entrant alien's conviction notwithstanding his previous deportation.
6. 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
7. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 242(b), (g), 244(e), 8 U.S.C. §§
1252(b), (g), 1254(e) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Act]. Sections
242(b), (g) and 244(e) provide that the Attorney General may permit any alien
to voluntarily depart from the United States in lieu of deportation at any stage
of the expulsion process. The primary benefit of voluntary departure is that
it avoids the stigma of deportation. Once an alien has been deported, he falls
within the excludable classes of aliens and ordinarily will not be granted admis-
sion for at least one year. See Act, § 212(a)(16), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(16)
(1970). See generally C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 7.2 (rev. ed. 1973). Furthermore, an alien who illegally reenters
the country after deportation is guilty of violating the Act. Act, § 276, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326 (1970). Cf. United States v. Palmer, 458 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Osuna-Picos, 443 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1971) (concerning raising
a Section 241(f) defense in the criminal proceeding). He is subject to a sen-
tence of up to two years in jail and/or a $1,000 fine, while illegal entry without
prior deportation is only punishable by a maximum term of six months in jail
and/or a $500 fine. Act, § 275, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1970).
8. See, e.g., Act, supra note 7, §§ 201(b), 203(a)(1)-(2) (1970). Section
201(b) provides that "immediate relatives" shall be admitted without regard to
the numerical limitations prescribed in the Act. See note 35 infra. Sections
203(a)(1) and (2) provide first and second preference status respectively to un-
married sons and daughters of citizens and aliens lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence who would not qualify as immediate relatives.
9. The Act provides the Attorney General with discretion to adjust the
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These alternatives have many drawbacks. The adjustment
of status provisions of the Act are inapplicable to Mexican and
all other Western Hemisphere natives. 10 Additionally, adjust-
ment of status is discretionary and seemingly unavailable to an
alien who has surreptitiously entered this country." For aliens
who have departed and are seeking re-entry, favorable treatment
is accorded only if they qualify as an immediate relative of a
United States citizen.' 2 The "immediate relative" of a United
States citizen is entitled to the issuance of an immigrant visa with-
out regard to numerical limitations ;13 however, that large class
status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United
States. Act, supra note 7, § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970). However, these
provisions are inapplicable to Western Hemisphere natives. Status may be ad-
justed for an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence after an application
for such status, if it is determined that the alien is eligible. See generally 8
C.F.R. § 245.1-.7 (1972). If an alien's application for adjustment of status is
granted, he is immediately entitled to an immigrant visa. Status may be adjusted
even after an order of deportation is entered. Act, supra note 7, § 244, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254 (1970).
10. In order to obviate the discrimination against Western Hemisphere na-
tives who are ineligible for adjustment of status and because this subject is under
consideration by Congress, the Service has instituted a Western Hemisphere
Equity Program. 119 CONG. REC. 65 (H3236-7) (May 1, 1973); letter to authors
from Joseph Sureck, then Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, Immigration &
Naturalization Service, dated 25 January 1974 (on file with CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.).
This Program grants special consideration to aliens from the Western Hemi-
sphere who are illegally in this country. In general, if the alien is an immediate
relative of a United States citizen or an unmarried child of a citizen or perma-
nent resident, or the spouse of a permanent resident alien, and it appears an
immigrant visa will be forthcoming, the alien will be allowed to remain in the
United States until the visa is obtained. See also Memorandum of Donald T.
Williams, Acting District Director, District 16, Immigration & Naturalization
Service, Los Angeles, California, dated April 16, 1973 (on file with CALIF. W.
INT'L L.J.).
11. The Act provides that only an alien "who was inspected and ad-
mitted or paroled into the United States . . ." may have his status adjusted. Act,
supra note 7, § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1970). (Emphasis added). There-
fore, one who enters this country surreptitiously would not be entitled to adjust-
ment of status.
The term surreptitious entry is used in this article to denote any entry ac-
complished without one physically presenting himself to immigration authorities
at a designated port of entry, e.g., entry in the trunk of a car or through or
over a border fence at a point away from a port of entry. See Matter of Ga-
bouriel, 13 I. & N. Dec. 742 (1971).
12. "Immediate relatives" are "the children, spouses and parents of a
citizen of the United States: Provided, that in the case of parents, such citizen
must be at least twenty-one years.... .. Act, supra note 7, § 201(b), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151(b) (1970).
13. The Act specifies the number of aliens who may be issued immigrant
visas or who may otherwise acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for
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of aliens whose familial ties are with another alien lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence are not entitled to this preferential
treatment. These aliens are required to wait significant periods
of time to obtain an immigrant visa. For example, Mexican citi-
zens now wait an average of twenty-two to twenty-four months
for entry. 4 Even those aliens who are immediate relatives of
citizens will suffer a delay of several months while their appli-
cations for a visa are being processed. 5 Thus, for the Western
Hemisphere native who is not entitled to seek adjustment of
status, and for the non-Western Hemisphere native whose appli-
cation for adjustment of status has been disapproved, leaving this
country and seeking re-entry will not only result in separation
from the family, but undoubtedly the loss of employment. Ob-
viously, the alien faced with this situation will seek to avoid de-
portation.
One of the most effective ways of avoiding deportation 6 is
to seek waiver of deportation pursuant to Section 241(f) of the
Act.' 7 Section 241(f) provides:
The provisions of this section relating to the deporta-
tion of aliens within the United States on the ground that
they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have
sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documen-
tation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepre-
sensation shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at
the time of entry who is the spouse, parent, or a child of
a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.
Although the scope of Section 241(f) has been frequently liti-
gated, it has only once been interpreted by the Supreme Court'8
and has received little attention from the commentators.'9 In
permanent residence. Id., § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1970). This section
specifically provides that the numerical limitations do not apply to the "immedi-
ate relatives" of a United States citizen.
14. Address by David Aberson, Esq., delivered at Immigration Seminar,
Sept. 20, 1973, at San Diego, California. See also Hearings on H.R. 981 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Immigration of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 21-27 (1973).
15. Address by Barbara Honig, Esq., of National Lawyers Guild. See Semi-
nar, note 14 Yupra.
16. For other ways of avoiding deportation, see notes 7 & 9 supra.
17. See Act, supra note 7, § 241(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1970).
18. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966),
noted in 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 118 (1967).
19. See, e.g., Note, Immigration-Relief from Deportation-Aliens with
Vol. 4
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view of this, and the impact leaving this country will have upon
an alien with familial ties, Section 241(f) will be examined with
a view towards determining which individuals fall within the pur-
view of the section. Suggestions will be made as to those areas
still awaiting definitive interpretation as well as present interpre-
tations of the section which should be considered ripe for further
judicial review. To facilitate this discussion, the statute has been
divided into four criteria which an alien must satisfy in order
to benefit from its coverage. First, the alien must be the spouse,
parent, or child of a United States citizen or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence. Second, the alien must be
within the United States subject to deportation proceedings.
Third, the alien must be deportable on the ground he obtained
entry by fraud. Fourth, the alien must be otherwise admissible
at the time of his entry. Critical to any analysis of Section 241(f)
is an understanding and appreciation of its legislative background
and history.
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Prior to 1808 the Constitution prohibited Congress from re-
stricting the entry of aliens into this country. 0 It was not until
1875 that Congress first enacted restrictive legislation excluding
from entry aliens who were "[11ewd and immoral . . . here for
the purpose of prostitution . . . [and] persons who are undergoing
a sentence for conviction in their own country of felonious crimes.
S. 21 In 1882 Congress banned aliens of Chinese ancestry
for a ten year period, 22 while additionally excluding "[a]ny con-
Familial Ties and Who Willfully Evaded Quota Restrictions are "Otherwise Ad-
missible" at Time of Entry, 42 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 118 (1967); Note, Immigra-
tion: The Criterion of "Otherwise Admissible" as a Basis for Relief from Depor-
tation because of Fraud or Misrepresentation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 188 (1966);
Note, Administrative Law-Immigration Law-Relief from Deportation Allowed
Independent of Attorney General's Discretion-Errico v. Immigration & Natural-
ization Serv., 349 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1965), 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351 (1965).
See also Note, Immigration Law-Deportation: What Fraud Hath Brought
Together Let No Man Put Asunder-Muslemi v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 408 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1969); 45 WASH. L. REV. 637 (1970); Comment,
Family Unity Doctrine v. Sham Marriage Doctrine, 1 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 80
(1970).
20. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9.
21. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, §§ 3, 5, 18 Stat. 477.
22. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 59. See gener-
ally The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Can Ping v. United States), 130 U.S.
581 (1889).
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vict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself
or herself without becoming a public charge .. ."I Three
years later Congress limited the number of contract laborers who
could enter the country.24 The list of the excludable classes was
expanded in 1891 to include "insane persons, paupers ...
persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous, contagious
disease . . .persons convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, [and] polygamists .... -25 In 1903,26 1907,27 and
191028 the list was further expanded by Congress and in 1917
comprehensive legislation was enacted which codified the previ-
ous enactments and repealed inconsistent provisions. 29  The pres-
ent Act, although making some refinements and modifications,"°
includes the same classes of excludable aliens found in the 1917
legislation.81
In 1921, Congress limited the number, as opposed to the
type, of aliens allowed entry into this country. The enactment
in that year was a temporary measure which allocated quotas to
each nationality totaling three percent of the foreign born persons
of that nationality residing in the United States in 1910.32 This
23. Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214.
24. Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600.
25. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084.
26. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 1, 32 Stat. 1213.
27. Act of February 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 1, 34 Stat. 899.
28. Act of March 26, 1910, ch. 129, §§ 1-3, 36 Stat. 263.
29. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874. This legislation
provided a comprehensive list of excludable aliens. The list included, in addi-
tion to those classes mentioned in the text: imbeciles, alcoholics, beggars, va-
grants, aliens found to be and certified by an examining surgeon as being men-
tally or physically defective, polygamists, anarchists, persons who believe in or
advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States by force or vio-
lence, persons who belong to subversive groups, persons with prior deportations,
children under sixteen years of age not accompanied by an adult, and illiterates.
30. There are now thirty-one enumerated classes of excludable aliens found
in the Act. Act, supra note 7, §§ 212(a)(l)-(31), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(l)-
(31) (1970). See text Section V. infra. Refining of the definitions did not
necessarily eliminate ambiguity. See, e.g., Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturali-
zation Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967); Appleman, Misrepresentation in Immigration
Law: Materiality, 8 FED. B.J. 267 (1964).
31. The present Act has a few classes, such as narcotic addicts, not cov-
ered in the 1917 legislation. See Act, supra note 7, § 212(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(1)(5) (1970).
32. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2, 42 Stat. 5. The percentage limits
provided in this legislation did not apply to the following individuals: govern-
ment officials and their families, aliens in continuous transit through the United
States, aliens visiting the United States as tourists or temporarily for business
Vol. 4
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national origins quota system for determining the number of en-
trants to be allowed was permanently established in 1924.11 This
legislation, as with the present Act, generally did not apply the
quota restrictions to Western Hemisphere countries or the chil-
dren, spouses or parents of United States citizens.84 Although
the method of determining numerical restrictions has changed, 5
the policy of restricting the number, in addition to the type, of
entrants has been continued until the present day.
The aforementioned laws restricting both the numbers and
types of aliens allowed to enter this country are to be contrasted
with those laws providing for the removal of aliens already in
this country. The former are said to deal with the exclusion of
aliens while the latter deal with the deportation of aliens. From
1801 until 1891, there were no laws allowing the deportation
of aliens found within this country.36 In 1891 Congress provided
for the deportation of aliens who had entered in violation of the
contract labor law and were apprehended within one year after
their entry.3 7  The 1891 Act also provided for the deportation
of any aliens within the excludable classes if apprehended within
one year after their entry.3 8  Legislation enacted in 1903 ex-
tended the time period during which excludable aliens could be
deported to three years after entry, and also provided that any
alien who became a public charge within two years after entry
could be deported. 39  Expanding grounds for deportation gener-
ally paralleled the expanding classes of excludable aliens, and
provided for the deportation of those aliens who would have been
or pleasure, and aliens from countries wherein immigration is regulated in ac-
cordance with treaties.
33. Quota Law of 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153.
34. Quota Law of 1924, ch. 190, § 4, 43 Stat. 153 and Act, supra note 7,
H§ 101(a)(27), 201(a)(b), 8 U.S.C. H9 1101(a)(27), 1151(a)(b) (1970).
35. Under the present Act the overall numerical limitation for the non-
Western Hemisphere is 170,000 persons per year. Preferences are related to in-
dividual characteristics, rather than country of origin, but no one country can
have more than 20,000 entrants per year. Act, supra note 7, §§ 201-3, 8 U.S.C.
H3 1151-3 (1970). The numerical limitation for the Western Hemisphere is
120,000 persons per year. Act of October 3, 1965 § 21(e), 79 Stat. 921.
36. Alien Act of 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570. This act and its companion,
the Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596, were heavily criticized. The latter was
of dubious constitutional validity. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 273-276 (1964). They both expired by their own terms in 1801.
37. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1086.
38. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1086.
39. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 20, 32 Stat. 1218.
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excludable at the time of their entry.40
In 1917 the time limits for deporting aliens were expanded,
including provisions removing all time limits for the deportation
of aliens committing certain criminal and subversive acts.41  The
1924 legislation, which established the quota system, provided
that aliens who entered in violation of the visa and quota require-
ments were also deportable without time limitation.42  The provi-
sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which are
essentially in force today, eliminated all limitations as to the time
in which deportation proceedings must be instituted.43 The ret-
roactive effect of the deportation provisions of the legislation
44
has been held not to violate the prohibition against ex post facto
laws.45
After a half-century of expanding the classes of excludable
and deportable aliens and reducing quotas, Congress enacted the
War Brides Act of 1945.46 This legislation allowed the entry
of the spouses and children of American servicemen without re-
gard to quotas and excused certain other requirements.47 In the
following year legislation was enacted permitting similar entry to
the fianc6es of American servicemen.4 s A further liberalization
of the restrictive entry and stem deportation provisions was ac-
complished in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. 49  This Act
admitted thousands of war refugees, but also provided for depor-
40. See notes 41-45 infra.
41. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889, provided:
[A]t any time within five years after entry, any alien who at the time
of entry was a member of one or more of the classes excluded by law;
any alien who shall have entered or shall be found in the United States
in violation of this Act . . . any alien who within five years after entry
becomes a public charge. . . shall be taken into custody and deported.
42. Quota Law of 1924, ch. 190, § 14, 43 Stat. 153.
43. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 241(d), 66 Stat.
181 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1964).
44. Act, supra note 7, § 241(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1970).
45. Lehmann v. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957). Cf. Cortez v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 395 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1968) (deportation does not con-
stitute cruel & unusual punishment).
46. The War Brides Act of 1945, ch. 591, § 1, 59 Stat. 659, provided:
[A]lien spouses or alien children of United States citizens serving in,
or having an honorable discharge certificate from the armed forces of
the United States during [W.W. II], shall, if otherwise admissible under
the immigration laws. . . be admitted to the United States ...
47. For example, the legislation excused physical and mental defects and
documentary requirements. War Brides Act of 1945, ch. 591, § 1, 59 Stat. 661.
See also Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
48. Fiancee's Act of 1946, ch. 520, 60 Stat. 339.
49. Displaced Person's Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009.
Vol. 4
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tation of those who made willful misrepresentations for the pur-
pose of gaining entry.5 ° Fearing political and social persecution
if repatriated, many refugees had misrepresented their nationality
and were therefore deportable.51 Despite great concern for the
plight of these refugees, ameliorative legislation was not enacted
until 1957.52
Section 7 of the 1957 legislation 5 was the forerunner of
the present Section 241(f). It waived deportation for an alien
who had fraudulently entered this country or was not of the na-
tionality specified in his visa, if the alien was the spouse, parent,
or child of a United States citizen or lawfully admitted permanent
resident alien and otherwise admissible. The section afforded
similar relief to an alien who was admitted to the United States
between 1945 and 1954, if the alien could satisfy the Attorney
General that his misrepresentations were predicated upon a fear
of persecution in his former country, and were not committed
for the purpose of evading the quota restrictions. The most re-
vealing statement concerning the Congressional intent in enacting
Section 7 is found in the House Report:
In respect to expulsion of aliens who are the spouses,
parents, or children of United States citizens or lawfully res-
ident aliens, and who are already in the United States, mis-
representation in obtaining documentation or entry would not
be a ground for deportation if the aliens were otherwise ad-
missible at the time of entry under the immigration law.
The latter category of aliens includes mostly Mexican nation-
als, who, during the time when border-control operations suf-
fered from regrettable laxity, were able to enter the United
States, establish a family in this country, and were subse-
quently found to reside in the United States illegally. 54
In 1961 Section 7 was repealed and replaced by Section
50. Displaced Person's Act of 1948, ch. 647, § 10, 62 Stat. 1013.
51. See H.R. No. 1365, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1952).
52. See H.R. No. 2096, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1952):
mhe sections of the bill which provide for the exclusion of aliens
who obtained travel documents by fraud or by willfully misrepresenting
a material fact, should not serve to exclude or to deport certain bona
fide refugees who in fear of being forcibly repatriated to their former
homelands misrepresented their place of birth.
53. Act of September 11, 1957, § 7, 71 Stat. 740, repealed, 75 Stat. 655
(1961).
54. See H.R. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1957); S. Rep. No. 1057,
85th Cong., lstSes. 11 (1957).
1974
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241(0. 55  Section 241(f) differs from Section 7 in that it con-
tains no provisions concerning aliens who had entered the United
States between 1945 and 1954 or were not of the nationality spe-
cified in their visas. The expressed Congressional intent respect-
ing these modifications indicates they were made merely to elimi-
nate outdated provisions, and were not designed to change the
substantive law. 56  Thus, the legislative history, while not expan-
sive, illuminates Section 241(f) as a Congressional response to
the plight of the illegal entrant alien with familial ties in this
country.
II. SPOUSE, PARENT OR CHILD OF CITIZEN OR
LAWFULLY IMMIGRATED ALIEN
A. Definition of Terms
The first requirement for invoking the benefits of Section
241 (f) is that the alien be "the spouse, parent or child of
a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence." The Act defines each of these terms individ-
ually, and while problems concerning the definitions have not
been significant, they do require some discussion.
An "alien" is defined in a negative sense as one who is not
a citizen or a national of the United States.57  A person may
acquire United States citizenship by birth 5s or naturalization. 9
An alien "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" is simply
an alien permanently residing in this country in accordance with
55. Act of September 11, 1957, § 7, 71 Stat. 740, repealed, 75 Stat.
655 (1961).
56. See H.R. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1961).
57. Act, supra note 7, § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1970). The
circumstances under which a person may lose his citizenship are beyond the
scope of this article. See generally Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). An
individual who has lost his United States citizenship is considered an alien, Man-
gaoang v. Boyd, 205 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 876
(1953). Any person who cannot prove he is a national or citizen of the United
States is considered an alien until such proof is forthcoming. See, e.g., Ameri-
can President Lines, Inc. v. Mackey, 120 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1953).
58. Act, supra note 7, §§ 301-7, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401-7 (1970). Of course,
any child born in the United States is a citizen regardless of the nationality
of the parents. Children born outside the United States to citizen parents are
also generally citizens. See generally Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
However, if the child is born out of wedlock and claims citizenship through the
father, the child must be legitimated by the father, prior to his twenty-first birth-
day. See notes 83-98 infra and accompanying text.
59. Act, supra note 7, §§ 310-44, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1422-55 (1970).
Vol. 4
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all relevant laws. 0
The term "spouse" includes any individual who is a party
to a marriage which is valid under laws in effect at the place
of origin. The marriage must not violate any state laws or laws
of the United States; not be entered into as a sham for the pur-
pose of evading immigration laws; and be consummated if the
marriage ceremony was conducted without the presence of both
parties.6 ' The principal rule respecting a marriage is that its va-
lidity is determined by the law of the place of origin.62  However,
if the marriage, although valid in the country of origin, would
result in criminal punishment for the cohabiting parties in this
country, the marriage is considered invalid and neither party
would be a "spouse."63  Thus, bigamous, 64 incestuous,6" and po-
lygamous", marriages although valid where contracted, would not
confer "spouse" status for purposes of Section 241(f). When
it is difficult to ascertain whether a particular marriage was valid
at the place of origin, inquiry usually focuses upon whether there
was a religious marriage ceremony. 7 If there was such a cere-
mony and the parties subsequently lived together in good faith
and their cohabitation would not be criminal in this country, each
party to the marriage will be considered a "spouse." 6s  The va-
lidity of a marriage is usually presumed,6" but when questioned,
the burden of proof rests with the person claiming the benefits
of that marriage. 70
60. Act, supra note 7, § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1970). See
Lai Haw Wong v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 474 F.2d 739 (9th Cir.
1973).
61. See generally C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 2.18a (rev. ed. 1973).
62. Matter of G-, 6 . & N. Dec. 337 (1954).
63. Matter of T-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 529 (1960). However, where a spouse
acted in good faith in entering a marriage, a subsequent determination that the
marriage was invalid will not subject this spouse to deportation. Matter of T-,
8 1. & N. Dec. 493 (1959).
64. Matter of L-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 472 (1957).
65. Matter of C-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 632 (1952).
66. Matter of H-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 640 (1962).
67. Matter of K-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 492 (1957).
68. Id.
69. Matter of F-, 9 1. & N. Dec. 275 (1961).
70. Matter of S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 513 (1961) (husband, married to another
seven months earlier, who made no effort to locate former spouse, failed to show
good faith in second marriage and therefore, presumption of validity held to be
rebutted). See also Matter of Awadalla, 10 I. & N. Dec. 580 (1964) (validity
of marriage doubtful because of defective divorce terminating prior marriage, and
burden of proof not satisfied).
1974
11
Wenzell and Kolodny: Waiver of Deportation: An Analysis of Section 241(f) of the Immig
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1974
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
The Act has special provisions concerning the deportation
of an alien who has obtained entry into the United States on the
basis of a sham marriage. 71  Any deportation charge founded on
such a marriage must be brought only under these provisions.72
This is true even though an individual who attempts to enter the
United States on the basis of a fraudulent marriage is also deport-
able because of the fraudulent entry or entry without a valid visa.
However, an individual who secures entry upon the basis of a
fraudulent marriage, but subsequently becomes the spouse, par-
ent or child of a citizen or lawfully admitted alien may claim
the benefits of Section 241(f).
71
In order to be a "child", one must be unmarried and under
21 years of age. 74  The definition includes a legitimate child and
a stepchild whether or not born out of wedlock. The marriage
creating the status of the stepchild must have taken place while
the child was under the age of eighteen. If the marriage creating
the stepchild relationship has been terminated at the time the
stepchild wishes to claim "child" status, such a claim will be dis-
allowed. 75  The term "child" also includes legitimated 76  and
adopted 77 children, and under some circumstances, an orphan
about to be adopted by a couple, one of whom is a citizen. 71
71. See Act, supra note 7, § 241(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1970):
An alien shall be deported as having procured a visa or other documen-
tation by fraud within the meaning of paragraph (19) of Section
212(a) . . . if he or she obtains an entry . . . on the basis of a mar-
riage entered into less than two years prior to such entry . . . which
within two years subsequent to any entry . . . shall be judicially an-
nulled or terminated....
72. Matter of T-, 8 L & N. Dec. 493, (1959); Matter of M-, 7 I. & N.
Dec. 601 (1957).
73. Scott v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 350 F.2d 279 (2d Cir.
1965), rev'd, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
See also, In re Yuen Lan Hom, 289 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (innocent
misrepresentation as to validity of marriage sufficient to entitle one to Section
241 (f)'s benefits).
74. See Act, supra note 7, § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (1970).
75. Matter of Simiecvic, 10 I. & N. Dec. 363 (1963).
76. See Act, supra note 7, § 101(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(C)
(1970). Legitimation is determined by the law of the child's or father's resi-
dence or domicile; it must take place before the child reaches 18, and must occur
while the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent.
77. Id. § 101(b)(1)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1970). The adop-
tion must conform with the law of the jurisdiction where performed. See Matter
of A-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 242 (1959); Matter of Lau, 10 1. & N. Dec. 597 (1964).
The child must have been adopted while under the age of 14 and have been
in custody of and residing with the adopting parents for at least two years.
78. See Act, supra note 7, § 1101(b)(1)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F)
Vol. 4
12
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1974], Art. 9
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol4/iss2/9
IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY ACT
Regarding illegitimate children, the Act provides that the
relationship to the mother is controlling. 79 The illegitimate child
whose mother is a United States citizen or alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence would be entitled to the benefits ac-
corded by Section 241 (f). Likewise, the alien mother of an ille-
gitimate United States citizen child or child lawfully admitted for
permanent residence would be a "parent" for Section 241(0 pur-
poses. However, the illegitimate child whose father is a citizen
or alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence would not be
a "child", and the alien father of a citizen child or a child law-
fully admitted for permanent residence would not be a "parent".
The term "parent" is not independently defined by the Act.
Instead, the Act provides that an individual is a "parent . . .
only where [that] relationship exists by reason of any of the cir-
cumstances set forth in .. 8.0 the definitions of a "child".
Thus, whether an individual is a "parent" depends solely upon
the relationship between that individual and a child. However,
in order to be a "parent" under the Act, a "child" by the Act's
definition, need not be in existence; only the requisite relation-
ship need appear. For example, an alien with a married United
States citizen child could be a "parent", but the child would not
be a "child", as defined by the Act.8 '
B. Problems Surrounding Discriminations
Based Upon Illegitimacy
Under the Act's definition, a legitimate child whose father
is a citizen, or alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
is considered a "child", while an illegitimate child of the same
father would not be a "child". 2 Likewise, the father of a le-
(1970). The individual must be orphaned because of the death, disappearance,
abandonment or desertion by the natural parents, or be a child for whom the
surviving parent is incapable of providing proper support. Additionally, adoption
must be sought by United States citizens and the visa application filed when
the child is under the age of 14.
79. id. § 101(b)(a)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (1970).
80. Act, supra note 7, § 101(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § l101(b)(2) (1970). If
the claimed relationship is to a resident alien, the resident alien must be lawfully
in this country. Lai Haw Wong v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 474 F.2d
739, 742 (9th Cir. 1973).
81. Matter of Louie, Interim Dec. No. 2223 (B.I.A. Aug. 27, 1973). Cf.
Matter of lesce, 13 I. & N. Dec. 156 (1967).
82. See Act, supra note 7, § 101(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § ll01(b)(1)(D)
(1970).
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gitimate child is considered a "parent" under the Act, while the
father of an illegitimate child is not a "parent". Thus, the Act
discriminates against a child on the basis of his or her illegitimate
status and against a male parent because of the illegitimate status
of his child.
8 3
Discriminations based upon illegitimacy raise the possibility
of a violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
of the laws. 84  For example, state statutes barring an illegitimate
child from recovering for the wrongful death of his mother85 or
prohibiting unacknowledged illegitimate children from recovering
83. The Act's definition of child also produces discrimination based upon
sex. An illegitimate alien child whose mother is a citizen or alien lawfully ad-
mitted for permanent residence is considered a "child". However, the illegiti-
mate alien child whose father is a citizen or alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence is not considered a "child". Likewise, the mother of either an
illegitimate citizen-child or lawfully admitted resident alien-child would be con-
sidered a "parent", while the father of this same child would not be considered
a "parent". Thus, the Act discriminates against an illegitimate child on the basis
of the sex of the child's parents, and against the male parent of either an ille-
gitimate citizen child or a child lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The
Supreme Court has held that discriminations based upon sex may violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (father of
an illegitimate child cannot be deprived of the child's custody unless the father
is shown parentally unfit where state does not deprive a mother of a child's
custody without such a showing); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (state law
preferring males over equally qualified females in administering estates is in-
valid). In evaluating sexual discriminations the Supreme Court has used the
"rational basis" test which merely requires that the discriminatory classification
have some rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. This test is far
less demanding upon the government than is the "suspect classifications" test.
Thus, if the government can defend a classification under the "suspect classifi-
cations" test, it will obviously prevail under the "rational basis" test. Conversely,
if the government cannot defend its discriminatory classification under the "sus-
pect classifications" test, the discrimination will be unconstitutional even though
possibly defensible under the "rational basis" test. Since discriminations based
on illegitimacy are tested under the "suspect classification" test, only that analy-
sis is treated here.
84. Although the Fifth Amendment does not explicitly guarantee equal pro-
tection of the laws, it implicitly does so. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969). Aliens lawfully in the country are entitled to equal protection of
the laws. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). It would also
appear aliens unlawfully here are entitled to the same protection. See cases cited
note 5 supra. This is not to say that all classifications discriminating against
aliens unlawfully in the country would be unconstitutional. Indeed, governments
might justify denying certain benefits to illegal entrant aliens. Cf. Sugarman
v. Dougall, supra at 647-649. However, the issue under consideration is whether
the Act's discriminatory classification regarding an alien's very status in this
country violates equal protection principles.
85. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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under workmen's compensation laws have been struck down by
the Supreme Court.86  A statute forbidding a mother from recov-
ering for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child also contra-
venes the equal protection of the laws.87  On the other hand,
in Labine v. Vincent,8" the Supreme Court refused to find that
an intestacy law which barred unacknowledged illegitimate chil-
dren from sharing equally with legitimate children violated equal
protection of the laws.
In resolving issues concerning discrimination based upon
illegitimacy, the Supreme Court has applied the "suspect classifi-
cations" test. Under this test:
Statutory classifications which either are based upon certain
"suspect" criterion or affect "fundamental rights" will be held
to deny equal protection unless justified by a "compelling"
governmental interest.
89
In addition to this test, the Supreme Court appears to evaluate
discriminations based upon illegitimacy in terms of the ease with
which either the parent or child could alleviate the discrimina-
tion.90 Thus, the Court recently distinguished Labine v. Vincent
by noting that there the father could have easily modified his
illegitimate daughter's disfavored position simply by making a
will.
91
Application of this test to the Act's classification of children
initially requires that the governmental interests arguably pro-
moted by the classification be delineated. First, the classification
can be said to control the number of aliens allowed to remain
in this country. Second, the classification can be considered as
discouraging promiscuity, illicit relationships and illegitimacy.
Third, the classification eliminates potentially difficult problems
of proof in the administration of the immigration laws. Assuming
that each of these governmental interests is "compelling", 92 the
86. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
87. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73
(1968).
88. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
89. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting
opinion).
90. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 US.. 164, 170 (1972).
91. Id. Labine v. Vincent may also be distinguishable since the laws limiting
immigration are of relatively recent origin while the inheritance laws under con-
sideration in Labine were of ancient origin.
92. The governmental interest in controlling the entry of aliens seems a
"compelling" one. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). The
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question remains whether the discrimination against illegitimate
children is necessary to accomplish these interests.
Respecting the governmental interest in controlling the num-
ber of aliens in this country, it is doubtful Congress by its defi-
nition of "child" intended to control the number of immigrants:
the legislative history indicates that the expansion of the defi-
nition of "child" to include illegitimate children was merely a re-
sponse to a narrow reading of the term by the Service. 3
Moreover, there are certainly more direct ways of controlling the
number of immigrants than discriminating against illegitimate
children. Thus, even assuming the Congressional purpose was to
control the number of immigrants, it seems obvious that the dis-
crimination is not necessary to accomplish this end.
It is also difficult to see how penalizing the alien child, fath-
ered by a citizen or lawfully admitted resident alien, will further
the governmental interest of discouraging promiscuity. Arguing
that a male would shun an illicit relationship with an alien female
simply because the foreign born offspring of that relationship
would not be allowed to remain in this country is tenuous, at
best. Moreover, the amount of promiscuity to be discouraged
is relatively small, since the class concerned is limited. The child
must, of course, not be born in the United States. The child's
mother cannot be a citizen, since in most cases even if the child
is born in a foreign country, the child would have defeasible
United States citizenship.94 Therefore, under consideration are
only ,the children produced by illicit relationships between a male
citizen or alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence and
an alien woman whose child is born outside the United States.
The primary problem of proof concerning the father of an
illegitimate child arises from the inherent difficulty in determin-
interests in detering promiscuity and alleviating difficult proof problems are often
argued to be "compelling". See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968);
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). In these cases,
however, the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled whether the interests are
"compelling". Instead, the Court has shown that the particular interest under
consideration is not significantly furthered by the questioned classification. This
analysis is used here.
93. See generally H.R. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1957); S. Rep.
No. 1057, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1957).
94. See Act, supra note 7, §§ 301(a)(7), (b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7),
(b), 1409 (1970). Generally, a child is a citizen if he comes to the United
States prior to attaining the age of twenty-three and lives here continuously for
at least five years between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight.
Vol. 4
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ing paternity.95 This problem is aggravated when the child is
born of an illicit relationship with an alien woman and is born
in a foreign country. However, the proof problems are attenu-
ated when it is recognized that the burden of proof rests upon
the child claiming Section 241(f) benefits. 96 The Service would
ordinarily not present proof, but merely review that presented
by the child who is required to demonstrate the existence of his
father. It would also seem reasonable to require that absent the
father's admission of paternity, or a prior judicial determination
thereof, the child's claim would not be established.9" In light
of the financial responsibilities and other adverse consequences
flowing from an admission of paternity, it seems unlikely that
many men would fraudulently make such an acknowledgement.9"
Furthermore, the Service is often confronted with the necessity
of determining claims based upon a child's assertion that a partic-
ular individual is his father.9 9 Consequently, with the burden
95. A child may learn the apparent identity of his father even without his
mother's cooperation from friends, other relatives or birth records. However,
proof of paternity is another matter. Properly conducted blood grouping tests
can only show a particular individual is not the father of a child. See generally
S. SHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS (4th ed. 1967); Note, Blood Tests
& the Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-California's Tangled Web, 20 STAN.
L. REV. 754 (1968). Normally, proof of paternity is obtained by the testimony
of the mother. Cf. S.D.W. v. Holden, 275 Cal. App. 2d 313, 321, 80 Cal. Rptr.
269 (1st Dist. 1969) (mother's testimony amply demonstrated that the father
of her child was the defendant in a paternity suit rather than her former husband
and blood tests substantiated that the former husband was not the father; how.
ever, California's conclusive presumption of legitimacy defeated the paternity
claim).
96. See Act, supra note 7, § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). This section
specifies that the burden of proof rests with the person applying for admission
or seeking other benefits under the immigration laws. See also Matter of Awa-
dalla, 10 I. & N. Dec. 580 (1964).
97. Paternity suits can often be nothing but unwieldy swearing contests.
See, e.g., Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 669, 169 P.2d 442 (2d Dist.
1946). Interjecting such proceedings into immigration hearings would be unfor-
tunate. Moreover, since the result of establishing that the child's father was
a citizen or resident alien would be to allow the child to remain in the United
Sates, the child's health and welfare must be considered. The father's admission
of paternity would result in providing for this support to some extent. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970).
98. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970) (providing criminal
punishment for failure to provide "clothing, food, shelter, medical attendance
or other remedial care .. "); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 1063/, §§ 56-64 (1971)
(providing for civil contempt proceeding against father who fails to support
child).
99. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lee Kum Hoy v. Shaughnessy, 237 F.
307 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 169 (1957).
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of proof upon the child, and the aforementioned requirements
in existence, proof problems would not significantly be increased
by a holding that an illegitimate child fathered by a citizen or
lawfully admitted resident alien was entitled to Section 241(f)'s
benefits.
Finally, it should be apparent that there is little the illegiti-
mate child can do to alleviate his disfavored position. The child
cannot force the father to legitimate him and cannot procure le-
gitimation on his own.' 0 The father may have difficulty in
legitimating the child, as legitimation is often a complicated, time
consuming procedure which may be impossible. 1 ' Additionally,
the legitimation process, even if available, would be made even
more difficult since the child and the mother will ordinarily be
in a foreign country. This difficulty in alleviating the illegitimate
child's disfavored position, coupled with the fact the discrimina-
tion does not appear to be justified by a compelling governmental
interest, reasonably leads to the conclusion that the discrimination
against the illegitimate child produced by the Act violates equal
protection principles.
The situation of a father whose illegitimate child is a citizen
or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence is a differ-
ent matter. If the illegal entrant father of an illegitimate child
were to be afforded benefits under Section 241(0, it would be
in the father's best interest to seek out illicit relationships with
a woman who is a citizen or lawfully admitted for permanent
residence. It would be in the father's interest to assure that a
child was born of his illicit relationship, even though this might
be adverse to the interests of the woman. 10 2  Consequently, a
holding that a father whose illegitimate child is a citizen or alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence should be considered
a "parent", encourages promiscuity and the bearing of illegitimate
children.
100. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170-1 (1972);
CAL. CVm CODE §§ 230 (West 1954) (California legitimation statute).
101. Id.
102. Justice Douglas has reasoned concerning unwanted pregnancies that:
[R]ejected applicants under the Georgia (abortion) statute are required
to endure the discomforts of pregnancy; to incur the pain, higher mor-
tality rate, and aftereffects of childbirth; to abandon educational plans;
to sustain loss of income; to forgo the satisfactions of careers; to tax
further mental and physical health in providing child care; and, in some
cases, to bear the lifelong stigma of unwed motherhood, a badge which
may haunt, if not deter, later legitimate family relationships.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Vol. 4
18
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1974], Art. 9
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol4/iss2/9
IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY Acr
Proof problems would also be aggravated by a holding that
the father of an illegitimate child should be considered a "par-
ent". It is difficult to disprove a male's claim that a particular
child is his.'0 3 The possibilities for fraud exist even if it is held
that the mother must substantiate the father's claim of parent-
hood. As contrasted with the case of the detriment to a father
who acknowledges an illegitimate child, the mother may be en-
couraged or pressured to name a father.'" The enhancement of
proof problems, coupled with the frustration of Congressional intent
respecting deterence of promiscuity, appears to result in the Act's
discrimination against the father of an illegitimate child not being
unconstitutional.
The problems inherent in proving the requisite familial ties
are clear. If an alien is unsuccessful in establishing as well as
proving these relationships, he will not be able to invoke Section
241 (f) relief. However, this first criterion has caused the fewest
problems. It is the remaining three criteria which have gener-
ated ,the most confusion and litigation.
III. WITHIN THE UNITED STATES SUBJECT
TO DEPORTATION
Section 241(0, by its very terms, indicates that it applies
only to deportation proceedings.10 5 However, every alien who
is apprehended on United States soil is not entitled to a depor-
tation hearing. "[Ojur immigration laws have long made a dis-
tinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seek-
ing admission . . . and those who are within the United States
after an entry, irrespective of its legality."'1 6  The former are
entitled to an exclusionary hearing, while the latter are entitled
to a deportation hearing. This distinction is not only critical be-
103. See note 95 supra.
104. For example welfare laws often provide that the mother must name the
putative father in order to receive welfare for the child. See, e.g., CAL. WEL.
& INST. Conm, § 1147 (West 1972).
105. The first sentence of this section reads: "The provisions of this section
relating to the deportation .... ." Act, supra note 7, § 241(f), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(f) (1970). The reference to "this section" obviously refers to § 241 which
contains the other deportation grounds. See notes 127-129 infra. See also
Khadjenouri v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 460 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.
1972); (Section 241(f) inapplicable to an adjustment of status proceeding); Mat-
ter of Caglio, 12 I. & N. Dec. 350 (1967) (Section 241(f) inapplicable to visa
petition proceedings).
106. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958).
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cause the Act confers privileges upon those subject to deportation
proceedings which are not conferred upon those subject to exclu-
sionary hearings, but also because an individual's rights in an ex-
clusionary hearing are more limited than in a deportation hear-
ing. 10
7
A case which highlights and can serve to clarify this distinc-
tion is Leng May Ma v. Barber.108 Leng May Ma was a native
of China who arrived in this country in May, 1951, claiming to
be a United States citizen because her father was a citizen. Im-
mediately upon her arrival she was taken into custody until it
could be ascertained whether or not her claim to citizenship was
valid. After having been in custody for over a year, she was
released from custody pursuant to Section 212(d)(5), 109 which
gives the Attorney General discretionary authority to temporarily
"parole" certain aliens into the United States. After having
failed to establish her claim of citizenship, Leng May Ma was
ordered excluded. She surrendered to the authorities and ap-
plied for a stay of deportation pursuant to Section 243(h)" ° as-
serting that her return to China would subject her to persecution.
Section 243(h) provides that its benefits are only available to
an alien "[w]ithin the United States. . . ." Moreover, Section
243(h) is applicable only in the case of an alien subject to de-
portation proceedings."' Thus, the question before the Court
107. Compare Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276
(1966) (burden of proof upon government to prove facts supporting deportation
charge by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence); Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (interpreting regulation allowing use of undis-
closed confidential information in immigration hearings to be restricted to ex-
clusionary hearings), with Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)
("Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far
as an alien denied entry is concerned.").
108. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
109. Act, supra note 7, § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970) which
provides:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United
States temporarily . . any alien applying for admission into the
United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as
an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall
• . . have been served the alien shall . . . be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United
States.
110. Act, supra note 7, § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970). This section
allows the Attorney General discretion to withhold deportation where he believes
the alien's return to his native land would subject him to persecution based upon
race, religion or political opinion.
111. The Court stated:
Section 243(h), under which [Leng May Ma] claims relief was inserted
Vol. 4
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could be phrased: Was Leng May Ma "within the United States"
or alternatively, was she subject to a deportation rather than an
exclusion hearing?
In resolving the issue, the Supreme Court reiterated the long
standing distinction made between those within the country and
those seeking admission into this country. The Court held that
the mere fact Leng May Ma had been paroled into the United
States pending determination of the issue of her right to enter,
could not change her status from one seeking admission, to one
within this country entitled to a deportation hearing. The Court's
decision in this regard was supported by the statute" 2 and earlier
cases, 1 1 3 and has been consistently followed." 4  Although Leng
May Ma may have been physically present in this country, she
was not "within the United States" for the purpose of the stat-
ute's application.
The words "within the United States" also appear in Section
241(f). The rationale for the Supreme Court's decision in Leng
May Ma supports a similar interpretation of these words as they
appear in Section 241(f). Moreover, the reference in Section
241(f) to its application in deportation proceedings, further evi-
dences that Section 241 (f) relief is limited to this type of proceed-
ing.
An "entry accompanied by freedom from official restraint"
is the phrase used to delineate those circumstances in which an
alien is entitled to a deportation hearing."' It should be empha-
sized that such an entry need not have been legal.116 Con-
by Congress not among Chapter IV's "Provisions Relating to Entry and
Exclusion," but squarely within Chapter V, a strikingly inappropriate
place if, as [she] claims, it was intended to apply to excluded aliens.
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958).
112. See note 109 supra.
113. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925); United States v. Ju Toy,
198 U.S. 253 (1905).
114. See, e.g., Yuen Sang Low v. Attorney General, 479 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1030 (Nov. 19, 1973) (alien in United States
20 years under parole not entitled to deportation hearing); Kordic v. Esperdy,
386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195, 197 (3rd Cir. 1954);
Lazarescu v. United States, 199 F.2d 898, 900 (4th Cir. 1952); United States
ex rel. Schirrmeister v. Watkins, 171 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1949).
116. Id. The Act defines "entry" as "any coming of an alien into the
United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession,
whether voluntarily or otherwise ....... Act, supra note 7, § 101(a)(13), 8
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versely, if the entry of the alien is produced while he is under
official restraint, the alien is not subject to deportation. 117  A
recurring problem in federal districts which share a common land
border with foreign nations, (such as the Southern District of Cal-
ifornia) is whether an alien who travels the short distance be-
tween the border line and the port of entry is entitled to a depor-
,tation or an exclusionary hearing.'1 8
Consider the case of an alien seeking entry through the port
of entry at San Ysidro, California, located immediately north of
the border from Tijuana, Mexico and approximately ten miles
south of San Diego, California. The pedestrian and vehicular
gates at this port of entry are located about 100 yards north of
the Mexican-United States border. Consequently, an individual
who has arrived at the inspector's station has traversed United
States territory for at least a short distance.
Although an alien coming to the inspector's station at the
San Ysidro port of entry may travel over United States soil, he
is realistically never free from official restraint. The access to
this port of entry is fenced in such a manner as to allow only
two choices, going to the inspector's station or returning to Mex-
ico. An individual facing this situation is in the same position
as one on board a ship arriving in this country. An alien arriving
on board a ship is entitled only to an exclusionary hearing," 9
not a deportation hearing. It has been indicated that even
though ports of entry may be inland from the actual international
boundary, the ports can be considered the "functional equivalent"
of the border. 2 ° Thus, the short journey over United States'
territory to the port of entry, literally free from official restraint,
would not entitle one to a deportation hearing.
The Act itself indicates that mere arrival at a port of entry
does not confer the right to a deportation hearing. The provi-
sions of the Act relating to the entry, inspection, and exclusion
of aliens, all provide that the determination of whether an alien
117. Thack v. Zubrick, 51 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1931); United States ex rel.
Bradley v. Watkins, 163 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1947).
118. See, e.g., Matter of Barragan, appeal filed, No. A20-000-136, B.I.A.,
Dec. 14, 1973.
119. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905).
120. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). See also
Thack v. Zubrick, 51 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1949).
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should be allowed admission into the country, or should be ex-
cluded, is to be made upon the arrival of the person at the port
of entry.' 2 ' Nothing in the Act even intimates that travel from
a foreign country to the port of entry would entitle one to other
than an exclusionary hearing.
Although it appears that an alien arriving at the port of entry
is not entitled to a deportation hearing, this result may be neither
fair nor reasonable. Consider an alien possessing all other cri-
teria necessary for application of Section 241(f) who comes to
the port of entry and either by fraudulent claim of citizenship,
or by the presentation of a fraudulently obtained document, actu-
ally procures entry into the United States. If this alien is later
apprehended he can defend against deportation upon the grounds
asserted in Section 241(f).12 2  On the other hand, an alien who
comes to the port and whose fraud is discovered before he is
allowed admission is only entitled to an exclusionary hearing.
128
The anomaly is aggravated if the alien is criminally prosecuted for
unlawful use of the false document. 124  An alien could be within
the criminal jurisdiction of the United States, convicted of unlaw-
fully entering and incarcerated in the United States, and yet, not
be "in -the United States" for the purposes of receiving a deporta-
tion hearing.
This inconsistent result also encourages fraud. For exam-
ple, an alien meeting the requirements of Section 241(f), who
learns that he cannot obtain its benefits by seeking fraudulent
entry at the port of entry, may consider surreptitiously entering
the United States. If he is apprehended in the United States
and deportation proceedings instituted upon the basis of a surrep-
titious entry, Section 241(f) will be inapplicable.' 25  However,
the usual method for ascertaining how entry was gained is for
the authorities to question the alien. Thus, the alien is encouraged
121. See Act, supra note 7, § 331-9, 8 U.S.C. §H 1221-9 (1970).
122. See text section IV inIra.
123. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
124. See note 137 infra. Compare United States v. Corsi, 65 F.2d 322 (2d
Cir. 1933) (alien prosecuted and incarcerated for preparing a false card which
was presented at port of entry did not secure an "entry"), with United States v.
Oscar, - F.2d -, No. 73-3606 (9th Cir. May 6, 1974) (alien who presents false
card at port of entry has not secured an entry for purposes of prosecution for
illegal entry under Act, supra note 7, § 275, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1970)).
125. See text accompanying notes 168-170 infra.
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to conceal his surreptitious entry and claim he entered the United
States through the port of entry by making a fraudulent claim of
citizenship. The unfortunate result is that the alien may be enticed
to commit the additional offense of willful misrepresentation12 in
order to obtain the benefits of Section 241 (f).
These anomalies could be avoided by a holding that the words
"within the United States" in Section 241(f) are to be given a
literal meaning.' 27 This holding would not only require strained
judicial interpretation of the statute, but also rejection of a chain
of precedent on questionable grounds. Such departures from the
principle of stare decisis are subject to deserved criticism and
should not be encouraged. Moreover, resolution of this issue
would require a determination as to how many immigrants Con-
gress wishes to allow to reside in this country. This decision
should not be made by the judicial branch. Congress has the
duty, '2 and should move to resolve this difficult political issue.
IV. THE REQUISITE FRAUDULENT ENTRY
Assuming an alien has established the required familial rela-
tionship and is within the United States subject to deportation
proceedings, the next criterion is whether the alien's deportation
is sought upon the grounds delineated in Section 241 (f). Section
241(f) relief is only available where deportation is based upon
the ground the aliens were "excludable at the time of entry
as aliens who have sought to procure, or have procured visas or
other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud
or misrepresentation. . . ." Thus, an alien whose deportation
is sought on the ground that he has been convicted of a crime
126. In addition to the unlawful entry, the alien's misrepresentations would
be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970) which provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations . . . shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years
or both.
127. Cf. Khadjenouri v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 460 F.2d 461
(9th Cir. 1972) (court refused to give a literal meaning to the words and held
Section 241 (f) inapplicable where an alien asserted fraud in procuring adjustment
of status); Chung Wook Myung v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 468 F.2d
627 (9th Cir. 1972) (Section 241(f) inapplicable where citizen child moved to
Korea and literal application would promote family disunity).
128. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522 (1954); The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United
States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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of moral turpitude,129 has become a drug addict,130 or has been
found to have engaged in subversive activities,' would not qual-
ify under Section 241(f). On the other hand, an individual who
faces deportation on the ground that entry was procured by a
sham marriage is entitled to the benefits of Section 241(f).' 2;
The question remains as to what other types of fraudulent entry
are encompassed in Section 241 (f).
The Supreme Court has said that if read "[1]iterally, Sec-
tion 241(f) applies only when the alien is charged with entering
in violation of Section 212(a)(19) of the statute which excludes
from entry '(a)ny alien who . . . has procured a visa or other
documentation . . . by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a
material fact.' "13 This is not entirely accurate since the lan-
guage of Section 241(f) does not parallel the language of Section
212(a)(19)."' Thus, Section 212(a)(19) does not specifically
provide for the exclusion of an alien who has actually completed his
entry into the United States. An alien who by making a false
claim of citizenship actually completed his entry would not be
covered by Section 212(a)(19) for he would not merely have
129. See Act, supra note 7, § 241(a)(4), (13), 18 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4),
(13) (1970). Section 241(a)(4) provides for the deportation of any individual
who within five years after entry is convicted of a crime involving moral turpi-
tude or at any time after entry is convicted of two such crimes. Section 241(f)
has no application in this instance since the basis for the deportation occurred
subsequent to the entry. Hames-Herrera v. Rosenberg, 463 F.2d 451 (9th Cir.
1972). Section 241(a)(13) provides for the deportation of any alien who has,
within five years after entry, aided and abetted the illegal entry of aliens for
gain. This separate ground for deportation does not allow for a Section 241(f)
defense. Castillo-Lopez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 437 F.2d 74 (5th
Cir. 1971). The fact that an individual is deportable for one of the separate
grounds stated in Section 241(a) should not be confused with the issue of
whether a person is "otherwise admissible". Some of the grounds for deportation
do overlap those for exclusion discussed in section V infra. However, whether
an individual is deportable for a ground stated in Section 241(a), to which Sec-
tion 241(f) is inapplicable, is an issue separate and distinct from whether a per-
son seemingly covered by Section 241(f) fulfills the "otherwise admissible" re-
quirement.
130. See Act, supra note 7, § 241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970).
131. Id., §§ 241(a)(6), (7), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(6), (7) (1970).
132. The Act specifically provides that an alien who has entered into a sham
marriage is deportable for having entered by a fraud under Section 212(a)(19).
Id., § 241(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1970). Consequently such an individual
would be saved by Section 241(f). Accord, Matter of Manchisi, 13 I. & N.
Dec. 132 (1967).
133. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 217
(1966).
134. The Act provides that any alien is excludable who "seeks to enter
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sought entry but would have actually procured entry. This alien
would be literally within the purview of Section 241(f) since he
obviously procured entry by fraud. Consequently, a consistently
literal reading of Section 241(f) would not necessarily limit its
coverage solely to persons excludable under Section 212(a)(19).
A reading of Section 241 (f) which would restrict its scope
to deportations based upon Section 241(a)(1) and 212(a)(19)
would be contradictory to expressed Congressional intent. If
Section 241 (f) is applied only to deportations based upon Section
241(a)(1) and 212(a)(19), there is no significant situation
where the Service could not defeat the application of Section
241(f) by simply electing a charge other than 241(a)(1) and
212(a)(19). In those cases where the entry was secured by
the use of a fraudulently obtained document, the alien could be
readily scheduled for deportation as being excludable at the time
of entry for failure to have a valid passport, visa, or other docu-
ment required by Section 212(a)(20).13 5  Furthermore, an alien
who had fraudulently obtained his immigrant visa might aggravate
his fraud by using such false documentation to acquire an alien
registration receipt card."3 6 In additon to subjecting himself to
criminal penalties for false statements made in obtaining the
card, 137 this alien would not have a valid alien registration receipt
card, which must be carried at all times. 38 He would, therefore,
be in violation of the Act and deportable under Section 241(a)
(2).1 39  If the alien with the fraudulent immigrant visa was un-
willing to exploit the fraud surrounding his entry and declined
the United States, by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact
... " Act, supra note 7, § 212(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19), (1970). In
contrast, § 241(f) provides for the waiver of deportation where deportation is
sought on the ground that the alien was "excludable at the time of entry as
one . . .who . ..procured . .. entry into the United States by fraud or mis-
representation...." Act, supra note 7, § 241(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1970).
135. Id. § 212(a) (20), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1970).
136. The Act provides for the fingerprinting and registration of aliens. Id.,
§§ 261-6, 8 U.S.C. §§ 3101-6 (1970).
137. Id., § 266(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1306(c) (1970). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1426
(c) (1970) providing for criminal punishment of an individual who, "uses as
true or genuine any false .. .paper . . . relating to .. . registry of aliens . ..
knowing the same to be false .... ." Cf. United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404
U.S. 293 (1971), holding that possession of a false alien registration receipt card
is not punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1970).
138. Act, supra note 7, § 264(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (1970).
139. The Act provides for the deportation of any alien who "is in the
United States in violation of the Act or in violation of any law of the United
States .... ." Act, (upra note 7, § 241 (a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1970).
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to register, he would be in violation of Section 262140 requiring
the alien to register within 30 days after entry. Here also, the alien
would be deportable under Section 241(a)(2) upon a ground
unrelated to the alien's fraudulent entry. Additionally, the Serv-
ice could always prosecute a person who has obtained a visa by
fraud for the criminal offense of fraudulently obtaining the docu-
ment. 14' This individual could then be deported under Section
241(a)(5). 142  Thus, by artful selection of the charges upon
which deportation is sought, the Service could easily avoid the
iapplication of Section 241(0 if it is read as applying only to
deportations pursuant to Sections 241(a)(1) and 212(a)(19).
It is abundantly clear that Congress did not intend that the opera-
tion of Section 241(0 be discretionary with the Service; 43 there-
fore, a literal reading would emasculate the legislative intent.
The administrative and judicial -rulings have consistently re-
iterated the position that Section 241(0 cannot be read literally.
This also was the position of the Supreme Court in Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Errico.14 In Errico, the Court con-
sidered the cases of two aliens facing deportation for not being
of the status specified in their visas, as was required by former
Section 211(a)(4). 45 The aliens were not being deported on
the basis of a charge under Section 212(a)(19). Implicit in the
Court's holding that these aliens were saved from deportation by
Section 241(f) was the holding that a charge under Section 212
140. Id., § 262, 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
141. See discussion in notes 126 and 137 supra.
142. Act, supra note 7, § 241(a)(4)-(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)-(5)
(1970). Section 241(a)(4) is the general deportation section relating to convic-
tion of crime while Section 241(a)(5) specifically provides that any individual
convicted pursuant to Section 266(c) of the Act shall be deported.
143. See Act, supra note 7, § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (1970) which
provides for waiver of exclusion on the identical grounds that Section 241(f) pro-
vides for waiver of deportation. However, Section 212(i) provides that the At-
torney General shall have discretion in the application of this section. Section
212(i) was based upon a portion of Section 7 of the 1957 legislation, the prede-
cessor of Section 241(f). See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra. The failure
to specifically provide for discretion in the deportation section while specifically
including discretion in the exclusion section coupled with the legislative history,
(note 54 supra) clearly reveals the legislative judgment that operation of Section
241 (f) should not be discretionary with the Attorney General.
144. 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
145. The Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, § 211(a)(4), ch. 477, §
211(a)(4), 66 Stat. 181 (1952), repealed, 79 Stat. 917 (1965) predicated admis-
sibility upon the immigrant being "of the proper status under the quota speci-
fied in the immigrant visa. .... "
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,(a)(19)' was not a prerequisite to Section 241(f)'s coverage.
The Supreme Court did not suggest what other types of fradu-
lent entry the "non-literal" reading of Section 241(f) would per-
mit. The lower courts have been left to struggle with what types
of fraudulent entries are included in Section 241(f). This strug-
gle is exemplified by comparison of several recent decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
In Lee Fook Chuey v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice,' 6 the court was called upon to decide whether an alien who
secured entry into the United States by making a false claim to
United States citizenship was saved from deportation by Section
241(f). An alien who enters the United States by making a
false claim of citizenship is deportable under Section 241(a)(2)
as having entered without inspection, since by claiming citizen-
ship, inspection under the immigration laws is avoided.' 4 7  In
Lee Fook Chuey, the government contended Section 241(f) did
not apply to this situation, but "only encompasses fraud or mis-
representation committed by an alien in the course of furnishing
information, or otherwise being processed as required by our im-
migration laws."' 4 8 The government attempted to distinguish Er-
rico on the ground that there the aliens did not totally evade
the immigration process, while a false claim of citizenship permit-
ted the alien to enter without being subjected to any of the nor-
mal alien screening processes. The government argued that the
fraud engendered in a fallacious citizenship claim results in a
more deleterious effect upon the enforcement of the immigration
laws than the type of fraudulent activity in Errico, and should
not be covered by Section 241 (f).
In rejecting these arguments the court initially noted that
it is the purpose of the immigration processing system to achieve
the important governmental function of "excluding aliens who
are mentally, physically, or morally undesirable."' 4 9 The court
indicated that the logical purpose for the "otherwise admissible"
requirement in Section 241(f) was to assure that these qualitative
grounds for admissibility did not exist.'50 The court held that
the government had ample opportunity to "determine qualitative
146. 439 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1971).
147. Matter of F-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 343 (1942).
148. Lee Fook Chuey v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 439 F.2d 244,
247 (9thCir. 1971).
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admissibility of these aliens during the investigatory process which
preceded any claim for relief under Section 241 (f).""' Thus,
a holding that Section 241 (f) encompasses false claims of citizen-
ship would not significantly impair the government's ability to
regulate the quality of immigrants.
The court also found the very enactment of Section 241(f)
showed that Congress would tolerate some avoidance of the im-
migration law's strictures.15 2  Since deportation is such a drastic
measure, resolution of any doubts as to proper construction of
the statute should be decided in favor of the alien. The court,
finding no meaningful distinction between the type of fraud in-
volved in a false claim of citizenship and that involved in Errico,
held a fraudulent claim to citizenship was encompassed within
the waiver provisions of Section 241(f).'
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. A very recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has ruled directly contrary to Lee Fook Chuey. Reid v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., - F.2d -, No. 73-1067 (2d Cir. Feb. 13,
1974) (2-1 decision) held that an alien who secures entry by making a false
claim to citizenship cannot be saved from deportation by Section 241(f). The
majority opinion conceded that a literal reading of Section 241(f) would include
an al~en who enters by a misrepresentation of citizenship. However, since the
Supreme Court in Errico had sanctioned a non-literal reading of the section to
foster its humanitarian purposes, see text accompanying notes 132-144 supra,
the majority reasoned that a non-literal reading restricting application of the
statute could also be sanctioned. Although the majority contended that the
legislative history of Section 241(f) did not indicate that it was meant to apply
to the alien who misrepresents his citizenship, they ignored the most illuminating
legislative history, see note 54 supra, which does indicate to the contrary. See
also note 177 infra. The majority's main argument against applying Section
241(f) to an alien who makes a false claim of citizenship was that this alien
totally escapes the immigration screening process. The majority believed "that
a post hoc investigation would not be an adequate substitute for the exhaustive
contemporaneous probe and examination required of the consular and I.N.S.
services." Slip Opinion at 1756. This argument is tenuous at best. Remember-
ing that it is qualitative rather than quantitative, see section V infra, attributes
that are to be measured, it should be apparent that a post hoc determination of
whether an alien is, for example, insane, mentally retarded, a narcotic addict,
possessed of a contagious disease, or a convicted felon is at most minimally
more difficult than a contemporaneous determination. Indeed, some qualitative
disqualifications would appear easier to ascertain after entry than at the time of
entry. The very example given by the majority to support their argument, deter-
mining those who are likely to become public charges, would seem best evidenced
by whether the alien had in fact become a public charge at a later time. It
also must be remembered that the burden is on the alien seeking Section 241(f)'s
benefits to show that he is "otherwise admissible." Consequently, whatever are
the difficulties in ascertaining the existence or lack of a qualitative disqualifica-
1974
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In Muslemi v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,1 54 the
alien entered the United States with a temporary visitor's (non-
immigrant) visa after having initially been denied an immigrant
visa. Muslemi overstayed the time allowed by his visa. Depor-
tation proceedings were then instituted on the ground that he
was excludable at the time of entry for not possessing a valid
immigrant visa as required by Section 212(a)(20).155 Five days
after receiving notification that deportation proceedings had been
initiated, Muslemi married a United States citizen and asserted
Section 241(f) as a defense. The Service chose to deport Mus-
lemi under Section 212(a)(20) because it was determined that
at the time of his application for a non-immigrant visa, he actually
intended to permanently remain in the United States, and there-
fore, had actually entered as an immigrant. 156 Since he entered
as an immigrant without a proper visa, Muslemi was deportable
under Section 241(a)(1) as an alien excludable at the time of
entry for failure to have a valid immigrant visa in his possession
as required by Section 212(a)(20). The court indicated that
it was not deciding the general question of whether Section
tion, such difficulties would redound to the benefit of the Service and the detri-
ment of the alien seeking relief. Furthermore, in almost all cases where a
Section 241(f) defense is presented, the Service is confronted with the problem
of verifying whether the alien was "otherwise admissible" at the time of entry.
This is so because visa applications rely heavily on answers and documents sup-
plied by the applicant, and the Service is not in a position to fully investigate
all the information supplied. Consequently, eliminating Section 241(f) defenses
in those cases where entry is accomplished by a false claim of citizenship does
little to eliminate the necessity of post hoc determinations of whether an in-
dividual is "otherwise admissible." Finally, the majority's suggestion that it
would be "extremely difficult, if not impossible," Slip Opinion at 1753, to make
a post hoc determination as to whether a person might be "otherwise admissible"
shows naivete about, if not purposeful ignorance of, Section 241(a)(1) of the
Act. Section 241(a)(1) allows the deportation of any alien who would have
been excludable at the time of entry for any of the reasons stated in Section
212(a). "[S]ince a large proportion of deportation proceedings are predicated
on this charge," C. GORDON AND H. ROSENFELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE § 4.7(a) at 4.36 (rev. ed. 1973), it is evident that the Service itself
does not find post hoc determinations concerning an alien's status at the time
of entry either difficult or impossible. Consequently, to suggest that giving the
alien an opportunity to do so would be disruptive of the screening process is
untenable.
154. 408 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1969).
155. Act, supra note 7, § 212(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1970).
156. The Act provides that every alien is to be deemed an "immigrant" un-
less he fits within a specific non-immigrant category, e.g., ambassadors, students
and those coming temporarily to the United States for business or pleasure. Id.,
§ 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1970).
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241(f) is applicable to aliens with the requisite family ties who
enter the country by presenting fraudulently obtained non-immi-
grant visas. 15 7  The court, focusing solely upon the deportation
charge brought against Muslemi, found this charge "resulted
directly from [his] fraudulent concealment of his intention to re-
main in this country permanently."'158 Therefore, Muslemi hav-
ing gained entry by fraud would be saved from deportation under
Section 241(f).'
59
The issue of whether Section 241(f) is applicable in the
case of an alien who enters with a fraudulently obtained non-
immigrant visa' 60 was presented in Cabuco-Flores v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service.'8 ' In Cabuco-Flores, two Philippine
citizens entered the United States as non-immigrant visitors and
subsequently, each gave birth to a child. Deportation proceed-
ings were commenced against each on the ground that they had
remained in this country longer than permitted by their visas and
were deportable for being in the United States in violation of
Section 241(a)(2). Both aliens asserted they were saved from
deportation by Section 241(f). Recognizing that Section 241(f)
cannot be read literally, the court noted that "Section 241(f)
is properly invoked only when a fraud is 'germane to the charge'
upon which deportation is sought . . .and the charge relates to
entry."' 62 The court held that Section 241 (f) would relieve
only those frauds or misrepresentations which the, government
must prove to establish deportability. 1 8  Section 241(f) did not
make the alien's fraud "independently exculpatory without re-




160. Vitales v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 443 F.2d 343 (9th Cir.
1971), rev'd mem., 405 U.S. 983 (1972) held that Section 241(f) was applicable
in the case of a non-immigrant who had obtained her non-immigrant visa by fraud-
ulently misrepresenting her intention to remain in this country. However, the
case was reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground of mootness when the
alien left the country pending hearing in the Supreme Court. See United States
v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-41 (1950). The grant of certiorari may
have been prompted by the fact that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits had reached
a conclusion opposite to Vitales. Ferrante v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
399 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1968); Tsaconas v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
397 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1968). Accord, Matter of Kanyzma, 13 I. & N. Dec.
514 (1970).
161. 477 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 841 (1973).
162. Id., at 110.
163. Id.
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gard to the proof required to establish the ground for deportabil-
ity relied upon by the government." 64 Therefore, Section 241(f)
was inapplicable to the cases under consideration since the govern-
ment had not sought to establish that the aliens' entries were
fraudulent, but simply that each had overstayed her non-immi-
grant visa.16 5
Justifying its conclusion, the court said its holding avoided
"the anomalous consequence that an alien may escape depor-
tation simply by 'substitut[ing] for his own convenience a ground
not involved in the deportation proceedings.' "166 The court did
not mention the more anomalous consequence that by its holding
the government could escape the application of Section 241(f)
simply by substituting for their own convenience a ground not
involving fraudulent entry. The court also found that Muslemi
and Lee Fook Chuey were not inconsistent with its decision since
in those cases the government had been required to prove a fraud
or misrepresentation had taken place during the entry process.167
In Monarrez-Monarrez v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 68 the court considered whether Section 241(f) would
apply to an alien who surreptitiously entered the United States
and who was being deported under Section 241(a)(2) for having
entered without inspection. In Monarrez-Monarrez, two aliens
had entered the United States surreptitiously; one later fathered
an American child and -the other married an American citizen.
Both aliens defended against deportation by asserting the provi-
sions of Section 241(f). The court rejected this contention since
the aliens "were not charged with fraud and they did not com-
mit any fraud or make any misrepresentations to gain entry."' 69
The court's reasoning was captured in one short paragraph:
Section 241(t) cannot be expanded to include petition-
ers. Fraud and misrepresentation cannot be equated to sur-
reptitious entry without bending the language of Sections 241
(a)(2) and 241(t) into shapelessness and without ignoring
the history of Section 241(t) recited in Errico. If petition-
ers' reading of Section 241(t) were adopted, no alien who
illegally entered this country and who was not otherwise in-
164. Id.
165. Id., at 111.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 472 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1972).
169. Id., at 120.
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admissible could be deported by reason of his illegal entry
after he acquired the requisite family ties. Congress had no
such alien bonanza in mind.170
Any attempt at reconciliation of the Cabuco-Flores and Mo-
narrez-Monarrez decisions with Lee Fook Chuey and Muslemi
would be no more than an exercise in sophistry. The result of
such an attempt would serve only to prove the axiom that the
law of the case is often determined by the composition of the
court. In Lee Fook Chuey the court found that the "major
purpose of Congress in establishing Section 241(0 was a human-
itarian desire to keep family units together."'1 71  The Lee Fook
Chuey court also set forth the following principles of statutory
construction which it believed were applicable in resolving the
issues concerning the scope of Section 24 1(f):
We have always understood that a cardinal principle of
statutory interpretation is that Congressional enactments
should be read as rational, coherent and purposeful elabora-
tions of legislative policy. They should never be construed
as establishing statutory schemes which are illogical, unjust
or capricious. We may never ascribe to Congress an intent
to provide different rules in functionally similar situations,
involving important individual interests such as the right to
remain in this country with one's family, based on purely
fortuitous factual differences. 172
Applying these principles to the cases of the surreptitious
entrant and the person who gains entry by misrepresenting his
true intent to stay permanently, leaves little doubt that Section
241(f) should be available to them. Those who enter surrepti-
tiously or overstay their visa cannot be meaningfully distinguished
from those who enter by misrepresenting their citizenship, skill,
or the nature of their marriage. The court's suggestion in Ca-
buco-Flores and Monarrez-Monarrez that the nature of the
charge, rather than the nature of the entry, is to govern the appli-
cability of Section 241(0 is inconsistent with Errico. This argu-
ment was made by the dissenters in Errico178 and was necessar-
ily rejected by the majority's holding that Section 241(f) bene-
fited the aliens. In almost every case of fraudulent entry a de-
170. Id.
171. Lee Fook Chuey v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 439 F.2d 244,
247 (9thCir. 1971).
172. Id., at 249.
173. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225-228
(1966).
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portation charge may be founded upon some basis other than
the fraudulent entry.' 4  Thus, as a practical matter, Cabuco-
Flores and Monarrez-Monarrez result in giving the Service un-
controlled discretion to determine whether the alien shall be
saved by Section 241(f) or deported. Granting such discretion
clearly contravenes the manifested Congressional intent.175  Fi-
nally, the court's argument in Monarrez-Monarrez that reading
Section 241(f) as encompassing surreptitious entries would result
in "ignoring the history of Section 241(f) recited in Errico
" . .,,176 is particularly unfortunate. Clearly, the legislative his-
tory as recited in Errico indicates that Section 241 (f)'s prede-
cessor was meant to benefit the surreptitious entrant.
177
The essential difference between the Cabuco-Flores and
Monarrez-Monarrez decisions and Lee Fook Chuey and Muslemi
is the degree to which the "alien bonanza" mentioned in Monar-
rez-Monarrez is emphasized. If one is convinced that Congress
intends to strictly regulate and restrict the immigrant population,
notwithstanding family ties, then obviously Monarrez-Monarrez
and Cabuco-Flores are appealing. On the other hand, if one
believes that Congress in enacting Section 241 (f), intended lim-
ited enlargement of the immigrant population to include those
with family ties or was implicitly aware of such a consequence,
then Lee Fook Chuey and Muslemi will be persuasive. The de-
cision regarding the size of the immigrant population is clearly
for Congress and not the courts.1
78
174. See text accompanying notes 134-42 supra.
175. See discussion in note 143 supra.
176. 472 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1972).
177. The House Report indicated that Section 241 (f)'s predecessor was pri-
marily to benefit "Mexican nationals, who during the time when border control
operations suffered from regrettable laxity were able to enter the United States.
. . ." H.R. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
Taken in its historical and literal context there is really little doubt that the
"regrettable laxity" mentioned was the simple fact that the border was not ade-
quately patrolled, making surreptitious entry easy. This situation may not have
materially changed. Cf. United States v. Bowen, - F.2d -, No. 72-1012 (9th
Cir. May 6, 1974) (en banc). However, whatever doubt emanated from the
House Report, the Supreme Court determined that the terms referred to entries
other than at the designated ports of entry, that is surreptitious entries. For in
Errico, the court noted that "it has always been far easier to avoid border re-
strictions when entering from Mexico, than when entering from countries
that do not have a common land border with the United States." Immigration
& Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 244 (1966). The only border
restrictions that are easier to avoid with countries sharing a common land border
with the United States are the ports of entry.
178. See cases cited note 128 supra.
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Where the legislative background and history do not provide
a clear solution to a problem within the Congressional domain,
reasoned and consistent judicial decision making is crucial. Judi-
cial speculation about present Congressional belief concerning the
scope of a statute's coverage does not justify departure from prior
decisions interpreting the statute. If a logically consistent line
of decisons produces a result Congress deems inappropriate,
Congress should correct the error. Furthermore, judicial reluc-
tance to altering a course of decisions should be heightened
where the existing decisions favor those who are in the least ef-
fective position to obtain legislative change. Obviously, the Serv-
ice has better access to the legislative machinery than does the
illegal entrant; therefore, construction of Section 241(f) should
favor the alien who is unable -to obtain legislative relief and stands
to suffer prolonged separation from his family and work. New
legislation in this area must be meticulously drafted and preceded
by detailed legislative intent, in order to assure that Congressional
intent is manifested and ambiguities as to the statute's scope are
minimized or eliminated.
V. THE REQUIREMENT OF BEING OTHERWISE
ADMISSIBLE AT THE TIME OF ENTRY
The final criterion which must be satisfied before an indi-
vidual is entitled to the benefits of Section 241(f) is that he be
"otherwise admissible at the time of entry." Although the words
"otherwise admissible" are not defined in the Act, they have re-
ceived the attention of the Supreme Court. In Errico, the Su-
preme Court considered the cases of two aliens, one of whom
had misrepresented his true employment skills in order to obtain
first preference quota status, and the other who had entered into
a sham marriage in order to obtain non-quota admission prefer-
ence. Each alien subsequently became the parent of a United
States citizen. The government initiated deportation proceedings
against each on the ground that they were excludable at the time
of entry under Section 241(a)(1), having determined they were
not of the status specified in their visa as required by then Sec-
tion 211(a)(4). 179  The government argued in both cases that
,to be "otherwise admissible at the time of entry, the alien must
show he would have been admitted even if he had not lied
179. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, § 211(a)(4), ch. 477, 66 Stat.
181 (1952), repealed, 79 Stat. 917 (1965).
1974
35
Wenzell and Kolodny: Waiver of Deportation: An Analysis of Section 241(f) of the Immig
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1974
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAw JOURNAL
... "I8 Since each alien would not have been admitted because
they illegally circumvented the quota restrictions, the government
contended they were not "otherwise admissible," and therefore,
not saved from deportation by Section 241(f).
In determining whether an alien committing fraud for the
purpose of evading quota restrictions was "otherwise admissible",
the Supreme Court concentrated upon an analysis of Section 7
of the 1957 act, 8 ' the forerunner of Section 241(f). Section
7 provided a waiver of deportation for an alien who was the
spouse, parent or child of a United States citizen, and for an alien
who entered during the post-war period but misrepresented his
nationality, place of birth, identity, or residence. With respect
to those who were not of the nationality specified in their visa,
Section 7 required that in addition to being "otherwise admissible
at the time of entry," the misrepresentation as to nationality must
not have been committed for the purpose of evading quota re-
strictions. The court reasoned that if a person who had evaded
the quota restrictions would not be "otherwise admissible," then
Congress' addition of quota evasion as a separate disqualifying
ground would have been redundant. Since Congress specifically
added that the evasion of the quota restrictions would make Sec-
tion 7 unavailable, Congress must have believed that this disqual-
ifying ground was not included with the scope of the "otherwise
admissible" limitation.
The Court also noted that "the fundamental purpose of
this legislation was to unite families."' 2  Additionally, it was
wholly consistent with this purpose to provide that aliens who
had misrepresented their nationality to avoid oversubscribed quo-
tas should be allowed to remain in the United States with their
families. Finally, the court noted that "even if there were some
doubt as to the correct construction of the statute, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the alien."'183
180. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 217
(1966).
181. Act of September 11, 1957, § 7, 71 Stat. 740, repealed, 75 Stat. 655
(1961). See text accompanying notes 53-55 Tupra.
182. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 220
(1966).
183. Id. at 219. The court might have further buttressed its argument by
noting that the term "otherwise admissible" was used in both the 1907 and 1917
Acts which antedated the quota restrictions which first appeared in 1921. See
.notes 27, 29, 32 supra.
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Errico decided that for the purposes of Section 241(f), an
alien might be "otherwise admissible at the time of entry," de-
spite the fact that at that time he did not satisfy all the pre-
requisites for obtaining a valid immigrant visa. The remaining
question was whether any other prerequisites to a valid entry
could be lacking and the alien still be "otherwise admissible
at the time of entry."
Shortly after Errico, the Board of Immigration Appeals
made a distinction between "quantitative" and "qualitative" im-
migration restrictions.
Immigration restrictions fall into two categories: (1)
those which put a limit on the number of aliens who shall
enter (numerical or quantitative), and (2) those which seek
to provide that only the morally, mentally, and physically
fit shall enter (qualitative). Numerical control of entering
aliens is achieved through the requirement that an immigrant
have a visa to enter. Some factors in the allocation of visas
under numerical limitations are in alien's training, his place
of birth, and his relationship to United States citizens or to
legally resident aliens ...
Qualitative restrictions provide that no undesirable alien
shall receive a visa or be admitted. Undesirable aliens are
those physically, mentally or morally disqualified; the sub-
versives; and the violators of criminal, immigration, or nar-
cotics laws. ... 184
Using this quantitative-qualitative distinction for the purposes of
determining whether an alien is "otherwise admissible" does not
seem unreasonable. The exclusion of physically, mentally, and
morally undesirable individuals is historically substantiated, hav-
ing existed long before numerical limitations and antedating pro-
visions for deportation. More importantly, if quantitative
grounds, that is those generally relating to documentary require-
ments, 8 5 were not held to be outside the scope of the term "oth-
184. Matter of Eng., 12 I. & N. Dec. 855, 857 (1958). This distinction was
quickly adopted by the 5th and 9th Circuits. De Vargas v. Immigration & Na-
turalization Serv., 409 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895
(1969) (prior deportation prevented the alien from being "otherwise admissible"
since the prior deportation constituted a qualitative as opposed to quantitative
restriction); Godoy v. Rosenberg, 415 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1969) (labor certifi-
cation requirement held not to render an alien "otherwise admissible" and §
241(f) relief granted).
185. Although the term "qualitative" adequately describes those who would
not be "otherwise admissible", the term "quantitative" does not adequately de-
scribe those who are "otherwise admissible". Consequently, in the remainder
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erwise admissible," several provisions of the Act where the term
appears, including Section 241(f), would be rendered ineffec-
tual.'
80
Section 212(a) of the Act lists those classes of individuals
who are excludable at entry, but not all of these restrictions are
qualitative. Initially, the disqualification stated in Section 212(a)
(19) is non-qualitative since Section 241(f) itself excuses this
ground. 8 7 Errico expressly held that an individual who was not
of the required quota status at the time of entry would still be
"otherwise admissible." Implicit in Errico was the holding that
of this article, those restrictions on entry which do not prevent a person from
being "otherwise admissible" will be referred to as "non-qualitative". Thus, a
"non-qualitative" restriction does not render one outside the coverage of Section
241(f).
186. If, in order to be "otherwise admissible", an alien must satisfy all doc-
umentary requirements, he would be led through a circuitous legal maze and
never be "otherwise admissible". The term "otherwise admissible" is used in sev-
eral sections of the Act: § 212(a)(9), (28)(I), §H 212(b), (g), (h), (i), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9), (28)(I), §§ 1182(b), (g), (h), (i) (1970). These sec-
tions allow certain grounds for excludability to be excused if the alien is "other-
wise admissible". For example, § 212(b) excuses the exclusionary ground of
illiteracy for certain aliens if they are "otherwise admissible". Excusing this
ground is a necessary prerequisite to obtaining a visa. If in order to become
"otherwise admissible" a visa must be obtained, but in order to obtain a visa
the alien must be "otherwise admissible", it can be seen that neither requirement
would ever be satisfied. Similarly, with Section 241(f), a fraudulent entry pre-
cludes the obtaining of a valid visa. However, if in order to be "otherwise ad-
missible" a valid visa was necessary, then the same fraudulent entry which would
make Section 241(f) available would preclude its operation by rendering the
individual not "otherwise admissible".
It has been argued regarding "otherwise admissible" that "in its context,
certainly, the phrase appears to comprehend all grounds of inadmissibility other
than fraud or misrepresentation." Note, Immigration: The Criterion of "Other-
wise Admissible" as a Basis for Relief from Deportation because of Fraud or
Misrepresentation, 66 COLuM. L. REv. 188, 196 (1966). This argument is not
persuasive since one of its basic premises is faulty. The argument assumes that
if the term "otherwise admissible" were read broadly, there would still be some
individuals who would fall within the scope of Section 241(f). None of the
examples given in the article support this premise. For example, if the phrase
"otherwise admissible" were given the broad meaning advocated in the Columbia
article, the lawfully admitted alien, who to avoid inconvenience, obtains entry
by a false claim of citizenship would be excludable for having entered without
inspection. See Lee Fook Chuey v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 439
F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1971). Thus, this individual would be inadmissible upon
grounds other than fraud or misrepresentation and the benefits of Section 241(f)
would be unavailable. Similarly, the alien whose misrepresentations in obtaining
a visa did not conceal an underlying ground of inadmissibility could still be con-
sidered as having an invalid visa and thus be inadmissible on that ground.
187. See text accompanying notes 132-33 supra.
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an individual not in possession of a valid visa would also be "oth-
erwise admissible." Lee Fook Chuey expressly held that failure
to possess a valid immigrant visa as required by Section 212(a)(20)
was a non-qualitative restriction, violation of which would not af-
fect the alien's "otherwise admissible" status.'"" The require-
ments stated in Section 212(a)(14) regarding labor certifica-
tion 18 9 have also been held to be non-qualitative. 190
Section 212(a)(21) requires that the entrant seeking admis-
sion have his visa issued in compliance with the applicable nu-
merical restrictions. 191 Former Section 21 1(a)(4) required that
before an alien could be admitted he must occupy the quota
status stated in his visa. 192 Section 212(a)(21) protects the in-
tegrity of the numerical restrictions while Section 211 (a) (4) pro-
tected the integrity of the quota restrictions. Errico held that a vio-
lation of former Section 211 (a) (4) would not prevent an alien
from being "otherwise admissible". The similarity between the nu-
merical restrictions and the quota restrictions' 93 reflects that a viola-
tion of Section 212(a) (21 ) should also not prevent an alien from
being "otherwise admissible".
Section 212(a) (26)191 presents another unusual situation.
This section provides that a non-immigrant without a valid non-
immigrant visa or border crossing card is excludable. This sec-
188. Lee Fook Chuey v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 439 F.2d 244,
250 (9th Cir. 1971).
189. Labor certification is required when an individual enters this country
to perform skilled labor unless he is the spouse, parent, or child of a United
States citizen, or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Act, supra
note 8, § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
190. Godoy v. Rosenberg, 415 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1969). See also
Becerra-Monje v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 108 (9th Cir.
1969).
191. See note 35 supra. Any immigrant who at the time of application
for admission does not have a visa issued in compliance with other provisions
of the Act is excludable at entry. Act, supra note 7, § 212(a)(21), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(21) (1970). For an examination of the provisions which must be
satisfied, see id., § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
192. See notes 144-45 supra and accompanying text.
193. See note 35 supra.
194. Act, supra note 7, § 212(a)(26), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(26) (1970) ren-
ders inadmissible:
Any non-immigrant who is not in possession of (A) a passport valid
for a minimum period of six months from the date of the expiration
of the initial period of his admission or contemplated initial period of
stay authorizing him to return to the country from which he came or
to proceed to and enter some other country during such period; and
(B) at the time of the application for admission a valid non-immigrant
visa or border crossing card ....
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tion presents a documentary restriction which by analogy to Sec-
tion 212(a)(20) would be a non-qualitative ground for exclusion.
Thus, a person not in possession of a valid non-immigrant visa
would still be "otherwise admissible". Consider, however, the
case of an individual who has obtained a non-immigrant visa by
a misrepresentation or fraud other than a fraudulent representa-
tion of his true intent for entering the country. Further assume
that the individual immediately after his entry becomes the
spouse or parent of a citizen. If, prior to the termination of the
time period stated in the non-immigrant visa, the Service at-
tempted to deport the alien on the ground he procured this doc-
ument by fraud, the waiver provisions of Section 241(f) would
save him from deportation. On the other hand, if the Service
waited until the visa expired (perhaps in preparation for the de-
portation hearing) the alien could then be deported for having
overstayed his visa. In the latter case, the Cabuco-Flores deci-
sion 9 ' leads to the intolerable result that by simply choosing
when to act the Service can manipulate Section 241(f)'s cover-
age.
Certain grounds for exclusion in Section 212(a) have speci-
fically been held to state qualitative restrictions rendering an alien
"otherwise [in]admissible". For example, Section 212(a) (22),'96
which excludes those who have left the country in order to avoid
the draft, is considered a qualitative restriction. 197  Individu-
als convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude are exclud-
able under Section 212(a) (9)198 and also are "otherwise [in]-
admissible". 19 9 Some of the crimes which involve moral tur-
195. See text accompanying notes 161-67 supra.
196. Act, supra note 7, § 212(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(22) (1970).
197. Jolley v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971) (due to his abhorrence to the selective
service system and war in Vietnam Jolley renounced his United States citizenship
and refused induction into the armed services; despite familial ties, he was ren-
dered "otherwise [in]admissible" and subject to deportation). Accord, Velasquez
Espinosa v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 404 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1968);
Loos v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 407 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1969).
198. Act, supra note 7, § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1970). In
Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the Supreme Court pointed out that
the meaning of "moral turpitude" in the context of the immigration statute must
be determined by examining its use in other areas and found further that the
phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" was not unreasonably vague and there-
fore did not offend due process requirements. Cf. Gubbels v. Hay, 261 F.2d
952 (9th Cir. 1958) (court marshall conviction not a crime of moral turpitude).
199. Hames-Herrera v. Rosenberg, 463 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1972) (alien had
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pitude are: assault with a deadly weapon; 00 murder and volun-
tary manslaughter,2 ' attempted suicide,2"2 rape,203 adultery, 20 4
prostitution,20 ' lewdness,206  arson,20  blackmail,2 0  forgery, 209
robbery,21 0  larceny,2 1' bribery, 212  willful tax evasion, 2" alien
smuggling while on parole into this country,214 and even some
misdemeanors.2 5 Even if moral turpitude is not involved, aliens
convicted of two or more, other than purely political, offenses
for which the aggregate sentences to confinement total five years
or more are "otherwise [in]admissible"." 6 However, the Act
specifically excepts from its coverage certain crimes and certain
offenses of younger individuals.2 17
been convincted of petty theft and forgery; although he had fraudulently pro-
cured a visa and was married to an American citizen, he was not "otherwise
admissible" and not entitled to Section 241(f) (relief). See also Matter of Eng.,
12 I. & N. Dec. 855 (1958).
200. In re Aliano, 43 F. 517 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890).
201. United States ex rel. Allessio v. Day, 42 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1930); Mat-
ter of S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 496 (1961); Matter of Abi-Rached, 10 I. & N. Dec.
551 (1964).
202. Matter of D-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 149 (1950).
203. Bendel v. Nagle, 17 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1927); Matter of R-, 3 I. &
N. Dec. 562 (1949).
204. Matter of A-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 168 (1948).
205. Matter of A-, 5 I.& N. Dec. 546 (1953).
206. Babouris v. Esperdy, 269 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1959).
207. Johnson v. Pepe, 28 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1928).
208. United States ex tel. Dentinco v. Esperdy, 280 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1960)
(defendant was convicted of conspiracy to extort).
209. Matter of S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 688 (1962).
210. United States ex tel. Cerami v. Uhl, 78 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1935).
211. Orlando v. Robinson, 262 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 980 (1959).
212. United States ex tel. Sollazo v. Esperdy, 285 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1961).
213. Chanan Din Khan v. Barber, 253 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1958).
214. Klapholz v. Esperdy, 302 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 891 (1962).
215. See, e.g., Hames-Herrera v. Rosenberg, 463 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1972)
(petty theft).
216. Act, supra note 7, § 212(a)(10), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10) (1970).
217. See Act, supra note 7, § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1970)
which allows entry where there is only one conviction which occurred, or the
imprisonment therefor ended, five years prior to the application for entry if the
crime was committed when the alien was under eighteen years of age. Whether
statutes allowing the expunging of convictions, which are often applicable to
youthful offenders, would render § 212(a)(9) inapplicable is not clear. See,
e.g., Kelly v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 349 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1965);
Garcia-Gonzales v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.
1965) (holding California provisions allowing guilty pleas to be set aside and
narcotic convictions to be dismissed do not thwart deportation). The Circuits
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The Act also specifically excludes stowaways,21 8 and it would
appear they are "otherwise [in]admissible".21  Three subsec-
tions of Section 212(a) deal with the exclusion of aliens who
are, have been, or may become engaged in subversive activities
or connected with subversive organizations.22 ° It has been held
that membership in the Communist Party at the time of entry
renders an alien "otherwise [in]admissible". 221  However, there
are exceptions to these rather lengthy provisions relating to sub-
versives and their activities. 2
Decisions are lacking which determine whether the remain-
ing excludable classes in Section 212(a) are qualitative or non-
qualitative. It would appear that with the exception of Sections
212(a)(24) and (30),223 all of the remaining classes set forth
are split as to the effect upon deportation of a certificate setting aside a convic-
tion under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1970). Com-
pare Hernandez-Valensuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962) (mere
possibility of certificate setting aside conviction does not render alien non-deport-
able) with Mestre-Morera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 462 F.2d 1030
(1st Cir. 1972) (obtaining the certificate setting aside a conviction renders alien
non-deportable even for narcotics conviction).
218. Act, supra note 7, § 212(a)(18), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(18) (1970).
219. Gambino v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 419 F.2d 1355 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). Stowaways may be equated to
surreptitious entrants; however, such an analogy ignores the logical reason for
excluding stowaways. The rationale for excluding stowaways is the prophylactic
effect upon the evasion of travel costs. A vessel captain discovering a stowaway
can either turn back or bring him to the destination. If the stowaway were
allowed entry at the destination, the ship line would rarely collect its costs. Con-
sequently, the exclusion of stowaways appears more an accommodation to inter-
national shipping problems than a statement of a type of fraud not qualifying
for Section 241(f) coverage. See text section IV supra.
220. See Act, supra note 7, § 212(a)(27)-(29), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27)-
(29) (1970). The determination whether the alien may engage in subversive
activities is determined by the consular office or the Attorney General.
221. Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1961) (alien as
youth had joined Hitler's Youth Movement and after the war became a member
of the Communist Party of East Germany; although he had the requisite familial
ties, his membership in the Communist Party rendered him "otherwise [inad-
missible" and he was deported).
222. See Matter of Mazar, 10 I. & N. Dec. 79 (1962) (alien who was a
citizen of Yugoslavia and had joined the Communist Party in response to de-
mands placed on her because of her officer rank in the army was "otherwise
admissible" because her membership was involuntary and not an indication of
her ideological belief).
223. Act, supra note 7, § 212(a)(24), (30), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(24), (30)
(1970). Section 212(a) (24) excludes:
Aliens . . . who seek admission from foreign contiguous territory or
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qualitative restrictions preventing a person from being "otherwise
admissible".
The conclusion may be drawn that the "otherwise admis-
sible" criterion of Section 241(f) merely describes those individ-
uals whose physical, mental, and/or moral undesirability would
allow their deportation despite the requisite familial ties. Con-
versely, those individuals whose excludability would be based
upon violations of documentary or regulatory provisions, but who
are not physically, mentally or morally unfit, will be saved from
deportation if the other three requirements of Section 241(f) are
satisfied.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having established familial ties in this country, an illegal en-
trant alien when apprehended is presented with a serious di-
lemma. Since the discretionary relief available is often illusory,
save to the most sophisticated, the alien must either depart, leav-
ing his dependant family to seek welfare or other assistance, or
face the stigma of formal deportation. Faced with long separa-
tion while immigration papers are slowly processed through the
bureaucratic maze, the most apparent remedy for the alien is Sec-
tion 241(f).
Successful assertion of Section 241(f) requires that the alien
be within the United States, possess the necessary familial ties,
have fraudulently entered, and be otherwise admissible. Recent
judicial interpretations of the section have failed to adhere to the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in interpreting the section, and
have refused to afford this ameliorative provision the expansive
reading such statutes deserve. Concern for the plight of the alien
in this country with familial ties necessitates the enactment of
incisive legislation. An example of the type of statute required
would read:
Any alien who has secured entry, as that term is defined
in Section 101(a)(13) and (A), who is the spouse, parent
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of a United States
citizen or alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence
and (B) who would not now be excludable for one or more
Section 212(a) (30) excludes:
[A]liens accompanying another alien ordered to be excluded and de-
ported and certified to be helpless from sickness, a mental or physical
disability or infancy . . . whose protection or guardianship is required
by the alien ordered excluded and deported.
1974
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of the reasons stated in Sections 212(a)(l)-(7), (9)-(13),
(17)-(18), (22)-(23), (27)-(29) and (30)-(31), and (C)
who is not now deportable for one of the reasons stated in
Section 241(a)(3)-(8) and (1l)-(17) shall be deemed an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
This provision should be added as a separate section of the Act
and be followed by subsections providing for prompt administra-
tion and enforcement of the statute.
The proposed statute is a significant departure from Section
241(0. It is more than a mere defense to deportation; it is
an affirmative grant of immigrant status to aliens who possess
the requisite familial ties.224  It also distinctly and specifically de-
scribes those aliens who shall not be afforded relief. The classes
benefited reflect a view which recognizes that an alien's depar-
ture from this country imposes hardship upon the individual and
the family.225  Addition or deletion of subsections could provide
for restricting or enlarging those eligible for such relief.
Congress, of course, must make the ultimate determination
as to how restrictive it wishes to be with respect to the residence
of aliens in the United States. Humanitarian principles suggest
that aliens who have familial ties in this country should be al-
lowed to strengthen them. It should constantly be remembered
that the necessity for a statute implementing this humanitarian
policy "[i]s simply the result of the ineffective enforcement of
the immigration laws, not the cause of it."' 226  Until Congress
acts decisively, interpretations of Section 241(f) constricting its
coverage remain inconsistent with the salutory principles an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Errico, and should continually
be challenged.
224. Under the present Act if an individual successfully asserts a Section
241(f) defense, his status in this country is ambiguous. Nothing in the Act
affords him the right to be granted an immigrant visa. On the other hand, the
successful assertion of a Section 241(f) defense renders him non-deportable. The
statute proposed here resolves this issue by specifically granting, to those who
qualify, the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
225. The proposed statute grants relief to children fathered by United States
citizens and aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The proposed
statute also requires that any reasons for exclusion, which are primarily those
presently considered qualitative, be determined as of the present time, rather than
the time of entry. Thus, an individual who may have entered the United States
as a pauper, but who has become successful in the United States would be enti-
tled to relief under the proposed statute.
226. Lee Fook Chuey v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 439 F.2d 244,
250 (9th Cir. 1971).
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